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CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING AND
RESTRAINT OF TRADE*
CHARLES L. GOLDBERG
W HAT has once been revolutionary, what has once been new,
becomes, by sufficient demand, use, and utility, a standard mode
of action.
It is economically sound to say that due to the tremendous strides
made by science and invention in the field of commercial pursuits,
situations have become far more frequent, complex, and tangled in the
commercial world than in the agricultural world. Consequently, com-
merce as such, has taken "seven league boot" strides onward, while
agriculture lagged behind. We need but touch upon some of the legal
consequences of such onward movement.
Commencing from the period of the introduction of machinery and
the factory system as a result of the overthrow of the feudal system
we have engendered such legal institutions as corporations, trusts and
combines of various lawful and unlawful natures. As a result of the
activities of these structures, there has grown up a tendency to check
the ever increasing trend toward combination for the purpose of
control of society. Thus there arose the common law restraint against
monopolies; and this common law restraint has been so thoroughly
imbedded in our law as to be recognized as universally good. It has
been crystallized into our state and federal legislation under various
names and guises, particularly under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law
and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act. We, in Wisconsin, have section
133.01 that declares the public policy of the state to be:
Every contract or combination in the nature of a Trust or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce is hereby declared illegal. Every
combination, conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement or contract intended to
restrain or prevent competition in the supply or price of any article or
commodity in general use in this state, to be produced or sold therein
or constituting a subject of trade or commerce therein, or which com-
bination, conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement or contract shall in any
manner control the price of any such article or commodity, fix the
price thereof, limit or fix the amount or quantity thereof to be manu-
factured, mined, produced or sold in this state, or fix any standard or
figure in which its price to the public shall be in any manner controlled
or established, is hereby declared an illegal restraint of trade.
The same general provisions are found in all the states of the Union.
It is apparent, without going further into the subject, that the com-
mon law rule of freedom of contract has an exception, namely such
contracts as are in restraint of trade.
* Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for degree of Juris
Doctor.
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It is common knowledge that commerce and agriculture go hand in
hand; that one is the raw material for the other. The basis of our
country's prosperity lies in an harmonious dealing of one with the
other. However, it seems as if agriculture did not keep pace with the
modern methods of production and marketing. It is but recently that
we find a tendency among farmers and agricultural people in general
to remedy the situation by pooling their products and forming what
might be called "combinations." There is no exception in the common
law rule against restraint of trade in favor of agriculturalists and the
problem arises; are or are not these combinations of farmers, these
combinations of the producers of agricultural products to be declared
legal or illegal? To quote from the Columbia Law Review.1
Co-operative marketing has found its way into the legal digest in the
garbled form of an exception to an exception. The rule is Freedom of
Contract, the exception pertains to restraint of trade; and the exception
to the exception is the freedom of farmers to combine in co-operative
societies. An exception to an exception does not work exactly like a
rule. We must not expect, for example, to find the law laying out a
plan, and offering a device under which farmers can work together in
the task of the marketing of their products. We must rather be satis-
fied with mere permission to use the corporate form of organization and
the form of contract when, as, and if, they meet the farmers' needs.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Perhaps the very first intimation of definite co-operative mar-
keting idea that can be pointed to, dates back to the organizing of
the Miami Exporting Company, 2 organized in 1803. It had for its
corporate purpose the finding of markets for the agricultural products
of the state. A trifle later we find records of the Welch Liebnig Ex-
porting Company,3 organized in i82o. It, likewise, was organized by
farmers for the purpose of marketing their products. These com-
panies were the forerunners of the present co-operative movement
and dispel the prevailing idea that the co-operative marketing move-
ment is a by-product of our day and age. The idea is neither new nor
novel. The form, however, has greatly changed since the days of
our forefathers.
In 1844 we find an attempt to foster the co-operative movement by
the Protective Union-which organization attempted to abolish profits
and sell merchandise to their members at cost. The underlying theory
of the movement seemed to be the injustice of profit. The idea was
'Vol. 28, No. 3.
2 Ohio Ag. Experiment Station, Bulletin No. 326. Nourse, "Legal Status of
Agricultural Co-operation."
*Ohio Ag. Experiment Station, Ibid. Nourse, Ibid.
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more the outgrowth of a workingman's union than a distinctive reform
in marketing.
The whole union movement of 185o and the following year in New
York, Boston, and Pittsburgh was permeated with the idea that co-op-
eration offered the best mode of protection to workmen and the ultimate
means of solution for the problems of labor, the revival of business
activity during the years 1853-1854 brought forth a new type of union.4
These, and later attempts made use of the legal devices already at
hand. Some employed the form of a corporation organized under gen-
eral enabling acts. Stocks were issued, boards were elected and in gen-
eral the existing machinery of the law was made to perform a new duty.
Others merely associated under the common law device of voluntary
associations.
The first stirring of the co-operative movement in the United States
did not leave behind any reminder of itself on the pages of our statute
books. In some cases these commercial activities were simply taken up
by trade unions or other bodies not organized for profit.5
The movement grew and became more widespread, especially under
the influence of the National Grange of the Patrons of Industry, com-
monly called the Grange. The Grange was a nation-wide organiza-
tion somewhat in the nature of a trade union, but had as one of its
objects the organization of the farmers. Local units sprang up among
agriculturalists with co-operation as their goal. While at this time
(around 1875) it was too late for any scheme of organization to
save the Grange from industrial death, the principles it advocated were
deeply imbedded in the local farmer units. The most salient of these
was that each member was to vote as a man, not in proportion to the
number of shares he held. Now then, since the farmer pools were for
the most part organized under the general corporation laws, such a
result was in sonle instances impossible. Moreover, there appeared
to be growing opposition by independent industrialists, to pools; and
the attacks on them were made on the common law monopoly rule.
Furthermore, the existing form was unsatisfactory because members
of the pools could violate the agreement and if any recovery might
be had at all, it merely consisted of money damages.
There was also a desire to prohibit other associations from using
the term "co-operative." Today we find in Wisconsin, Sec. 185.22,
making it a misdemeanor for those not authorized to use that term.
It was also felt that financial aid would ultimately be forthcoming
should the state specifically recognize the co-operative as a district
unit.
'Nourse, p. 28, Ibid.
'Nourse, 29, Ibid.
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Thus, the farmers appealed to the legislatures for aid. The first
"co-operative marketing law was passed in Michigan in 1865 which
allowed the establishment of co-operative stores, but in 1875 it was
amended to include agriculturists. Pennsylvania followed in 1868,
Minnesota in 187o and Wisconsin and Kansas in 1887.6
These early statutes included merely the fundamental principles of
the Grange and provided for (I) the one man vote; (2) limitations
on capital holdings; (3) distribution of profits in pro rate to business
done with the association.
From thence forward the movements of legislation have been rapid
and changing. It soon was recognized that co-operative marketing
could not be run on the basis of a business making profit; that in
some instances the presence of common stock was an inducement for
the managers to direct their attentions more to the payments of divi-
dend, than to adequate handling of the produce. It became apparent
that dividends could not and did not represent the worth or selling
price of a farmer's product, but were in reality a profit of a business.
There appeared the non-stock association. In 1895, the California
Non-Stock Law supposedly fostered by the Farmers' Alliance, was
passed. It followed in structure the fraternal association idea of
England. In 19o9 Alabama followed with a like law; and Wisconsin
in 1911, amended in 1921, 1925 and 1927. Today practically all the
states have non-siock laws on their books.
The general purpose of all of these non-stock laws was merely to
allow co-operatives to organize under a special form of business unit.
Very few of the newly passed statutes made any mention of public
policy-very few of them intimated that the enabling law was to be
protection against the attacks on subsequently organized pools because
of restraint of trade. It was not until much later that such definite
declarations were made, and not until after the question had been
thoroughly stirred up in litigation.
LEGALITY OF THE UNIT
The nature of the marketing associations is to be determined frcm
the prevalent ideas of those who organized them. As previously
mentioned, the prevalent idea in the minds of the members was that
justice could be done only by combining to protect their product prices
'from the organized purchasing power of corporations and "gentle-
men's agreements" of independent buyers.
Regardless of the economic viewpoint, the organization of the
associations involved an attempted fixing of prices and an attempted
control of markets. By limiting the dealings to their members there
'Nourse, Ibid.
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can be no question but that technically they were violating the common
law rule of freedom of conduct.
While the pools were organized primarily to combat what they con-
sidered the "trusts power," the attack on them was based on the
theory that they themselves were conspiring to restrain trade. The
above noted objections were strongly urged against the pools and, in
most of the early cases, successfully so. The early cases on co-opera-
tive marketing recognized no distinction for a proper constitutional
classification between farmers and others. They, in effect, declared
that any attempted restraint of trade, any combination that had con-
trol of otherwise free acting agencies as its good, was a violation of
the rule against monopoly.
At this point it might be well to point out the trend of Federal
and state legislation on the question of monopolies. In 189o the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act was passed-the provisions of which are
familiar to all in the profession. It was apparent even at this time
that the issue of farmer co-operation would sooner or later have to
be faced. Thus an amendment was proposed to the act as follows:
Provided that this act shall not be construed to apply to any arrange-
ments, agreements or combinations between laborers made with a view
of lessening the number of hours of their labor or of increasing wages;
nor to any agreements, arrangements, associations or combinations
among persons engaged in horticulture or agriculttqre made with the
view of enhancing the price of their own agricultural or horticultural
products.
7
The bill with the amendment was referred to the judiciary com-
mittee but was reported out without the amendment. The Sherman
Anti-Trust Act was passed without an exception in favor of agri-
culture.
Many of the states immediately wrote into their statute books acts
similar to the Sherman Act. Illinois was among the leaders in 1891.
The Wisconsin provision is quoted earlier in this paper.
In a relatively short time after the passage of the Sherman Act
and the Illinois Act a case directly involving the questions we have
been discussing came before the court." The facts are, that within
the immediate vicinity of Chicago some 1,5oo producers of milk com-
bined informally into an association for the purpose of negotiating a
price with the milk dealers. The association in its declared purpose
was organized to obtain "a just return for the sale of same; to rid
the field of city distribution of irresponsible and dishonest dealers;
to establish a central bureau of information for the shippers' benefit,
etc."
'Congressional Record, 51st Cong., Ist session, p. 2726, Nourse.
'Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Assoc., 155 Ill. x66, 39 N.E. 651 (895).
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The Illinois Court, however, held this was a combination in re-
straint of trade, that regardless of its stated purpose, it was organized
"to control the price of the purchase and sale of milk to retail dealers
within the limits of the city of Chicago"; that its members "carry out
a scheme which is a combination, agreement or trust by which they
fix the price on an article of merchandise and limit the amount to
be sold." The decision in this case was followed consistently for
about twenty years.
In Texas an attempt was made, when passing the Anti-Trust Laws,
to exclude the Farmers' Co-operative Association from its operation.
In the case of In re Grice9 the court held the statute in question un-
constitutional on the grounds that it violated the constitutional prohi-
bition against taking property without due process of law and also
because the statute denied to citizens the equal protection of the laws.
In the Grice case no Farmers' Co-operative Marketing Association
was involved and this fact may account for the failure of the court
to realize the fact that a proper classification may be made of such
associations. The court says:
This Statute under discussion is clearly class legislation and discrim-
inating against same and favoring others. We are familiar with the
duties of the farmer and the cares and trials of his business life
and appreciate highly the customary compliments paid by mankind to
the rural yeomanry of the land. Yet what is there about all that to
entitle him to the privilege of combining in restraint of trade as to
those articles he produces, while his neighbors, the storekeepers and
mechanics are precluded therefrom. This law, that deprives the citizen
of his rights of contract and that seeks to divide citizens not exactly by
the calling they follow, but by the source of the property they hold and
exempts 8o per cent of them from the penalties it visited upon the
remainder, is not sustained by any good reason or excuse; it is notjust, it is utterly without the support of the law, is vicious class legisla-
tion depriving citizens of his constitutional right of life, liberty and
property without due process of law, contrary to the law of the land;
and is therefore declared to be null and void.
The Grice case was closely followed by the famous Connoley case
(i9o2)10 and the United States Supreme Court again went on record
as allowing no exemption to agriculturists who combined, if such
combine constituted an attempted restraint of trade. The facts were
as follows: The Union Sewer Pipe Company-an Ohio corporation
-did business in Illinois with the defendent Connoley, who gave the
plaintiff the notes being sued on. The defense, in essence, consisted
of the fact that the plaintiff was a combination in the form of a
trust in restraint of trade and commerce and doing business as such
979 Fed. 629 (897).
1 184 U.S. 540, 22 St. Ct. 431.
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in violation of the provisions of the Illinois Anti-Trust Act. The
answer to the defense set up that the Illinois act was unconstitutional
because it exempted from its operation agricultural products or live
stock while in the hands of the producer or raiser. The court in
upholding the replication of the plaintiff restates the generally known
principle that in order to maintain a statute which is discriminatory, the
distinction between the classes affected must be based upon an inherent
difference in those classes.
It is apparent that the mere fact of classification is not sufficient to
relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and that in all cases it must appear, not only that a classi-
fication has been made, but also that it is'.one based upon reasonable
ground-some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the
attempted classifications,-and is not a mere arbitrary selection.
The court, however, seems to be unable to justify the attempt of the
Illinois Legislature to place agricultural products on a different basis
than other producers. They say:
It may be observed that if combinations of capital, skill or acts in
respect of the sale or purchase of goods, merchandise or commodities,
whereby such combinations may, for their benefit exclusively control
or establish prices are hurtful to the public interest and should be sup-
pressed, it is impossible to perceive why like combinations in respect
of agricultural products are not also hurtful ..... .To declare some
of the class engaged in domestic trade or commerce shall be deemed
criminals if they violate the regulations prescribed by the state for the
purpose of protecting the public against illegal combinations ......
and that others of the same class shall not be bound to regard those
regulations . . . . is so manifestly a denial of the equal protection
of the laws that further argument would seem to be unnecessary.
This case, in somewhat strong language, commits the court to the
rule that producers of agricultural products are not entitled to im-
munity as a special class, nor do they as such constitute a reasonable
basis for a constitutional classification. Yet in the Connoley case
Justice McKenna writes a well reasoned dissenting opinion-an opinion
which was later destined to be the better view of the law.
In neither of the last two cases was a co-operative association
directly involved. Both controversies dealt with the interpretation
of state anti-trust statutes which exempted from their operation com-
binations of agricultural producers. We now turn our attention to
a few leading cases which directly involve farmers' marketing asso-
ciations. It is not unreasonable to say that the weight of the fore-
going cases materially guided and ruled the courts in their decision
on those following.
It was at about this time (1910-1915) that the country's agricul-
tural interests took on an added impetus in the field of co-operation.
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The gradual development of the associations, in spite of legal attacks,
brought about a realization that the heretofore l6ose corporate asso-
ciation could not bring about the desired results unless there were in-
serted into the contracts of the members machinery providing for its
enforcement. Heretofore the organization had been based on the
assumption that members would deal exclusively with the association
because, in most instances, the return to the member depended upon the
amount of business transacted with the pool. With the advent of the
non-stock association, however, the method of computation was
charged to net return of the sale of each producer's product. Conse-
quently the enforcement weapon of the pool was gone; if the member
by chance or through the intermeddling and bribery of an independent
buyer sold his product outside the pool, no method remained for
the association to repair the wrong. Manifestly, money damages were
not adequate, for money damages would not insure the continued
existence of the associations. Consequently as a means of insuring
permanent support and giving the necessary stability to farmers' or-
ganizations, the penalty clause was inserted into the farmers' contracts.
Generally this "maintenance clause"" took the form of a definite
price per unit sold outside the pool as liquidated damages. The attack
on the pools then had two fronts-for the "maintenance clause" was
regarded as a penalty and as additional definite evidence of the tend-
ency of the pools being conspiracies in restraint of trade.
In 1913 the question was presented to the Iowa Court in Reeves v.
Decorah Farmers' Co-operative Association.12 The plaintiff was a
local hog buyer and his complaint stated that the defendant company
was so organized as to drive him from the field of competition. One
of the by-laws of the society read as follows:
In order to insure future success and prosperity of this society its
members and shareholders are required to sell all their marketable
produce and live stock to the society. Any member or stockholder who
may prefer to sell his produce or live stock to a competitor in this
ma-ket shall forfeit to the company and pay over to its treasurer from
the proceeds received from produce or live stock so sold to other firms
or competitors the amount as follows: five cents for every hundred
weight sold to any competitor.
The local hog buyer requested, and obtained, an injunction restrain-
ing the association from collecting the penalty on the ground that
such a contract was in restraint of trade and illegal as a violation of
the Iowa anti-trust laws. After quoting at length from the anti-trust
statutes the court reviews a number of cases which uniformly held
combinations illegal.
"Term adopted from Nourse.
16o Iowa 194, 14o N.W. 844.
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Without reference to this chapter (referring to anti-trust laws)
monopolies have always been odious at common law, and all contracts,
arrangements or agreements in restraint of trade or of free competition
were void..... .As a rule a contract which creates such a monopoly
as to put it in the power of such combination to raise or lower prices
is invalid. (Cases cited)......
Whilst originally all contracts in restraint of trade were illegal, some
exceptions were introduced into the common law, and the rule now
seems to be that such contracts are not illegal save when unreasonable
in character and that where incident or ancillary to some lawful con-
tract, as between vendor and purchaser, partnership, employer and em-
ployee; and not unreasonable in their scope or operation, they are not
illegal. 13
This court then, held that a combination of farmers for the purpose
of marketing their products through an agency of their own was
"unreasonable in character." The Reeves case was widely discussed
and followed in numerous state courts through the country.
Shortly after the Reeves case the Alabama court handed down a
decision closely following the lines of the Iowa court. The case
(Georgia Fruit Exchange v. Turnipseed)14 also involved a situation
wherein an independent buyer, feeling aggrieved at the condition of
the market due to the co-operative movement of the producers,
attacked that association on the identical grounds used in the Decorah
case. The court then said:
It cannot be fairly doubted but what the parties to the contract con-
templated that this protected market and resilient enhanced price was to
come only as a consequence of plaintiff's success in subsequently pro-
curing or securing other peach growers, in such numbers 'as, with de-
pendent would amount to the producers of at least 6o per cent of the
peach crop to . . . . pledge plaintiff the absolute right to handle their
fruit crop. Plaintiff thereby became master of the situation, so far as
regards the sale and disposition of at least 6o per cent of the peach
crop of the country . . . . and would remain such master as long
as the parties, defendent and the other required number of growers
kept their contracts with the plaintiff to market their crop through it.
It gave the plaintiff a commanding position in fixing the prices of
peaches in this section of the country. It could direct the market to
which any shipment would go and withhold from any market all ship-
ments or limit the supply at a particular market, thus forcing up the
price. It is clear that the real design was to stifle and destroy at the
various markets competition between defendent and other growers who
became members of the pool by allowing the plan to direct the crop from
the channels of trade in which it would have ordinarily flowed if each
grower had been left to act independently and to choose his own market,
'Montague v. Lawry, 193 U.S. 38, 24 Sp. Ct. 307. Moore v. Bennett, 140 Ill.
69, 29 N.E. 888. Hoover v. Graves, 7 Bing 73F. Jayne Co. v. Turner, 132 Ia. 7,
109 N.W. 307.
i'9 Ala. App. 123, 62 So. 542.
CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING
and to so direct the shipments of these several growers as to avoid
competition between them at the markets where they before competed.
The Alabama case quoted extensively from the Ford Milk case and
apparently was guided by the decision therein. As late as 1918 these
two cases were followed by the Colorado court in Burns v. Wray
Farmers Greens' Company.15
It was at about this time that there appeared to be a changing atti-
tude in some of the courts toward co-operatives. In Castorlane Milk
& Cheese Company1 it -was held that a penalty of $2.oo per cow per
year for failure to deliver milk to the association did not constitute
such an unreasonable feature of a contract as to render it in restraint
of trade. The court, without reference to any of the cases above
referred to, says: "I cannot see how the agreement in any respect
offends the law as being a monopoly and an unreasonable restraint of
trade."
In Bullnille Milk Producers Associations v. Armstrong, 7 also a New
York case, the agreement provided for $io.oo per cow as liquidated
damages. The court:
It seems to me that the agreement in question constitutes a valid and
binding contract and is not void as against public or restraint of trade.
... . It was quite necessary that they be assured of continued
patronage of their members in order to justify the association in going
to the expense of acquiring or erecting a creamery. It cannot be said
that an agreement such as this would tend to restrain trade or stifle
competition; on the contrary, it seems to me that it encourages com-
petition by bringing a new creamery into being.
The changing attitude is well shown by the situation that developed
in Kentucky. The tobacco interests in Kentucky secured the passage
of a special statute in 19o6, the first section of which was:
It is hereby declared lawful for any number of persons to combine,
unite, or pool any or all of the crops of wheat, tobacco, corn, oats, hay or
other farm products raised by them, for the purpose of classifying
grading, storing, holding, selling or disposing of same, either in parcels
or as a whole, in order or for the purpose of obtaining a greater or
higher price therefor than they might obtain or receive by selling said
crops separately or individually.
The second section provided that contracts which are entered into
for the purpose of carrying out the above idea are not to be declared
invalid or illegal.
It is difficult to see just why the manner or enactment of a special
statute covering the subject is of any more force and effect than a
65 Col. 425, 176 P. 487.
ic 179 N.Y.S. 131.
17 178 N.Y.S. 61:2.
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declaration in an anti-trust statute which expressly exempts co-opera-
tive agricultural associations. Both methods of procedure are certainly
declaratory of the intended public policy of the state. Both methods
involve the same questions of construction and constitutionality. Yet
the Kentucky court, when the question was directly presented to them
in Owen County, Burley Tobacco Society v. Brumack, 8 held that
the statute was not in violation of the anti-trust acts, but was a legiti-
mate classification. The defense insisted that the statute in question
violated the Fourteenth Amendment in answer to which the court said:
This section has been frequently considered by the Supreme Court
of the United States and it has ruled that it does not deny the state
to classify professions.
The opinion of the court is remarkable for the fact that very little
time is spent in discussing technical restraint of trade. The weight
of the opinion is devoted to an inquisition of the "reasonableness of
the price."
In an earlier opinion the Supreme Court has noted the fact that
not all combinations in restraint of trade are illegal. Only those
which are unreasonable are invalid. With the case made exception
in mind, the court proceeds:
It would seem that trusts, pools, and combinations, the only purpose
of which is to obtain a fair and reasonable price for an article are
permitted ..... .If the act of 19o6 . . . . owners were to place
the price of crops above their real value it would clearly be a violation
of the constitution.
The case presents a very interesting question. The anti-trust stat-
utes declare restraint of trade illegal, i.e. the structure if unreasonable
is sufficient to indict and stigmatize the entire situation. In this case,
the court judges the unreasonableness of the restraint of the result.
It clearly intimates that as long as the pool obtained no price higher
than the "real value" (a very difficult and elusive thing at best), the
mere fact of an illegal structure is not sufficient to impeach it. The
decision impliedly recognizes the underlying principle that a state may
change its public policy, yet limiting that change to cases involving
proper classification.
In rapid succession followed the cases of American Seed Machinery
Company v. Commission9 and Commission v. The International Har-
vester Company of America,0 which held that despite the fact that
tobacco associations were held legal regardless of their raise in prices
which almost doubled and trebled their original prices in some in-
1128 Ky. 137, 197 S.W. 710 (19o8).
152 Ky. 589, 153 W. 972.
131 Ky. 551.
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stances, the companies in question were condemned and fined as vio-
lating the anti-trust statutes.
The American Seed Machinery Company and the International Har-
vester Company were held in the lower courts to be combinations in
restraint of trade even though the test laid down was unreasonableness
in the price, not in structure. The ruling in these two cases, however,
was reversed in International Harvester Company of America v. Ken-
tucky.21 Interpretation of the lower courts of Kentucky interpreted"
the anti-trust statute to hold that such statute prohibited trusts or
combinations to form for the purpose of selling articles of the com-
panies at a price in excess of their real market value.
The plaintiff was prosecuted and fined for combining under the
laws with other companies and was charged for selling their machines
above their real market value. The United States Supreme Court
said in the above named case:
When the Court of Appeals came to deal with the act of 1891 (Anti-
Trust Act), the constitution of 1891 (by which it was made the duty
of the legislature to prohibit trusts from lowering or raising prices be-
low or above their real value), and the act of 19o6 (which exempted
farmers from the operation of the act) had reached the conclusion
. . .. that by interaction and to avoid the question of constitution-
ality they were to be taken to make any combination for the purpose
of controlling prices lawful unless for the purpose or with the effect
of fixing a price that was greater or less than the real value of the
article.
The plaintiff contends that the law has construed offers no standard
of conduct that is possible to know.
The court then answers the proposition that according to the rulings
of the lower court the rule by which they are to be governed is "the
market value under fair competition and under normal market con-
ditions." The court then indulges in a contemplation as to whether
the rule laid down is real or illusionary and arrives at the conclusion
that a combination invited by the law, to organize cannot be expected
to guess at its peril, what its products would have sold for if the
combination had not existed. That is expecting too much of human
ingenuity. Consequently, by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court the practical effect of the anti-trust laws was nullified, for if
it be impossible to judge what is a combination in restraint of trade,
there is no real excuse for prosecuting one for a mistake in judgment.
After the decision of this case, the Kentucky court then held as
did the majority of her sister states, that farmers vho sell their crops
under the guise of combination and restraint of trade are no more to
be favored than any other like combination.12
234 U.S. 216, 58 L.E. 1284.
' Gay v. Best, 166 Ky. 833.
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THE STANDARD MARKETING ACT
Mr. Sapiro, doubtless the outstanding figure in the co-operative field,
felt that the attitude of the courts was crystallizing a public policy,
which to say the least would be detrimental to the life of such or-
ganization. He felt it incumbent upon him, for the benefit of the
associations he represented, to have legislative saiction of the theory
of marketing he expounded. As a result of Mr. Sapiro's endeavor
there appeared the Standard Marketing Act.
Mr. Sapiro had been actively engaged in the organization of the
associations in California and in Oregon, and, as a result of such
experience, there was presented to the Texas Legislature an act which
embodied the essential requisites necessary to the continued operation
of pool activities. The measure was passed in substantially the form
tendered and shortly thereafter the standard act was embodied in the
statutes of the states of Arkansas, Idaho, Arizona, Kansas, Montana,
North Carolina, North Dakota, and Georgia.
In 1922 the famous Bingham Act, perhaps the most severely liti-
gated of all, was enacted in Kentucky. By 1924 practically every state
in the Union had added a co-operative marketing act upon its books.
The principles embodied in Mr. Sapiro's act included a lengthy
statement of its purpose which while not essential to its validity, had
the function of informing the courts and legislators of the meaning
and interest of the act.2 2a
Thus, Section (I) of the Act was as follows:
In order to promote, foster and encourage the intelligent and orderly
marketing of agricultural products through co-operation; and to elim-
inate speculation and waste; and to make the distribution of agricultural
products between producer and consumer as direct as can be efficiently
done; and to stabilize the marketing of agricultural products, this act is
passed.
Part of Section 5 of the Bingham Act reads:
... . and that the public interest demands that the farmer be en-
couraged to attain a superior and more direct system of marketing in
the substitution of merchandising for the blind unscientific and specu-
lative selling of crops; and that for this purpose farmers should secure
special guidance and instructive data from the dean of College of Agri-
culture of the University of Kentucky.
There is, then, an attempt to impress on the jurists that the farmers
are a proper basis for classification-that the act is not discriminatory
but aims toward the well being of the state . . . . that the public
have a vital interest that is being guarded by this act.
Immediately, in the states that adopted the Standard Act, litigation
forced it into the courts for interpretation . . . . and let it be said
'Nourse, Ibid.
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for the honor of Mr. Sapiro's work, that in the great majority of
cases, the courts, contrary to their previous holdings, upheld the legis-
lation as proper and beneficial.
In Hollingsworth v. Texas Hay Association 23 the question was
raised as to whether an association incorporated under the Texas act
and using a "maintenance clause" in its contract was a combination
in restraint of trade. Briefly the court disposed of the contention
saying:
By Sec. 26 (of the Anti Trust Statutes) it is explicitly provided:
"No association organized hereunder shall be deemed to be a combina-
tion in restraint of trade or an illegal monopoly or an attempt to
lessen competition..... ." We know of no constitutional reason why
the public policy of the state may not be so declared.
In 1921 the Supreme Court of Oregon passed on the question in the
case of Oregon Growers' Co-operative Association v. Lenz. 24 The
Oregon Act allowed co-operators to stipulate for liquidated damages
in their by laws and provided for specific performance and injunctional
remedies in their members contracts. In an action by the pool against
one of its members, the validity of the law was attacked. The court,
however, upheld the constitutionality of the statute. It should be
borne in mind that the court here was dealing with an association
which had embodied in its by laws very strict and ordinarily unen-
forceable remedies. There is no doubt but that at common law the asso-
ciation would have been condemned as an illegal restraint of trade.
Its contracts with its members would have been declared ancillary to
that vicious purpose and would undoubtedly be unenforceable.
The decision of the court is a fine exposition indicating the general
change in public policy and unequivocally recognizing the right of the
legislation to change such public policy.
On April 12, 1923, the Supreme Court of North Carolina handed
down its decision in the famous case of Tobacco Growers Co-operative
Association v. Jones.2 The opinion was later widely quoted and
considered perhaps the ruling case up to a few months ago. Perhaps
it would be best to set forth the words of the court itself in dealing
with the question of interpreting the standard co-operative marketing
act in regard to the restraint of trade. The court said:
It is clear that there is nothing in the statute to enable the producers
to combine to sell their products at a profit beyond what would be a fair
and reasonable market price. Indeed this would be impossible on the
part of the producers as only a part of them would in any event belong
to such an organization; whereas the manufacturer of tobacco being in
3246 S.W. io68 (1922).
24 107 Ore. 561, 212 P. 811.
1858 N.C. 265; 117 N.E. 174 (1923).
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comparatively a few hands, the buyers could combine as they have done
for many years in a so-called "gentlemen's agreement" . . . . with
the well known result that the producers of tobacco, the farmers, have
received the bare cost of production . . . . while the combination of
tobacco manufacturers have accumulated vast fortunes.
In view of the necessity of protecting those engaged in raising
tobacco against the combination of those who buy the raw product at
their own figures and sell it to the public at prices also fixed by them-
selves, this movement has been organized. By a careful examination of
all the provisions of the act under which the Association is acting, it will
be seen that every precaution has been taken to insure that it will not
be used for private gain . . . . but to protect the tobacco producers
against oppression by a combination of those who buy and not to author-
ize, and does not empower those who produce the raw material to create
a monopoly in themselves.
Indeed it seems to us plain that the plaintiff under the provisions of
its charter is not and never can become a monopoly for many reasons:
(.I) As a corporation of North Carolina the moment it should become
dangerous to the public, if that were possible under the terms of its
charter, the General Assembly can at any time repeal its charter; Con-
stitution, Article VIII, Section I ; and the courts will intervene to pre-
vent it becoming a monopoly. (2) The plaintiff has neither capital stock
nor surplus; nor credit except as given it by the statute and this latter
may be withdrawn at any time. It is wholly dependent upon its ability
to borrow in large sums which is necessarily under the control of the
Federal Reserve Banking system and the moment it shall deny credit
to the plaintiff its sufficiency would be destroyed. It can borrow from
the Federal Reserve system, which is a function of the Government only
on such terms as that Board deems consistent with the public welfare
and the Board will not permit hoarding or monopolizing by the plain-
tiff.
The plaintiff will continue to exist only if it provides for a normal,
orderly, marketing of the tobacco crops and by putting on the markets
of the world annually the production for that year. Its sole purpose
is by an orderly marketing of the crop to make large savings and to
secure to the producers a fair and reasonable price therefor without
increasing the price the consumer will pay for the manufactured article.
The sole object of the association is to protect the producer of the raw
articles from depression in the price by the combination of the large
manufacturing corporations controlled by a few men who can at the
same time not only decrease the price to the producer, but can increase
it at will to the consumer and thereby accumulate in a few hands sums
beyond computation. The Co-operative Association purposes to elim-
inate unnecessary expenses in selling and to prevent artificially forced
reduction in the price paid to the producers. Instead of creating a
monopoly, the object is by a rational method of putting the raw prod-
uct on the market from time to time as there is a legitimate demand
for its manufacture, and by the extension of credit to farmers to enable
this to be done, to prevent a monopoly of the tobacco industry by those
who manufacture it.
Thus it seems that the object of the co-operative law is to pro-
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tect farmers from unfair practices by combination of produce buyers.
The statute is held valid not in spite of the restraint of trade, but
on the ground that no unfair monopoly or unfair prices result. The
court takes the logical viewpoint and it may be inferred from this
opinion that it should be shown definitely that unfair prices have been
obtained in an artificial market any association, pool or combine,
which produces this situation, would be as amienable to the anti-
trust laws as any other conspiracy in restraint of trade. It will be
noted that the standard act provides in section i for a "distribution of
agricultural products between consumer and producer as direct as
can be efficiently done and to stabilize the market of agricultural
products," and in section 5, "A more direct system of marketing in
the substitution of merchandising for the blind unscientific and specu-
lative selling of crops." The distinction drawn in these and other
cases to follow seems to be that whereas the states may not exempt
from the operation of an anti-trust statute a class of people, that is,
exempt farmers and farmers' produce from liability under the con-
spiracy to restrain trade, the state may nevertheless declare its public
policy to be that combinations or associations of farmers for the pur-
pose of marketing their products are not conspiracies, but rather a
mere method of producing orderly marketing in the place of chaotic
uncertain speculations. No one may combine to restrain trade, that
is, no one may conspire to restrain trade, not even farmers. But
farmers may combine for the purpose of orderly marketing and it
seems to be the declared public policy that such combination is not
to be considered a conspiracy in restraint of trade. The distinction is
hair fine, but is now the law of the land.
To continue with the case law on the subject, we find case of Kan-
sas Wheat Growers' Association v. Schulte2" and the same Association
v. Charlet37 In the latter case the court says:
Defendant says the court found the contract was made for the pur-
poses of obtaining wheat, keeping it off the market, and putting it in
a pool to raise the price of wheat. What the court did was to de-
scribe the association as an organization of wheat growers associated
together to pool their wheat and withhold it from the market until
such a time as the association desired to sell. The Court made no find-
ing of purpose or practice, and, in view of the minute findings which it
did make, could have had no competent evidence before it of purpose
or practice contravening the great public policy which the Legislature
sought to promote by the Co-operative Marketing Act.
Very shortly after the decision in the Schulte case the Supreme
Court of Missouri in Brown v. Staple Cotton Co-operative Associ-
20 113 Kansas 672, 216 P. 311 (1923).
27118 Kansas 765, 236 P. 657 (1925).
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ation28 joined the ranks of those courts who declared themselves to be
in favor of a liberal interpretation of the anti-trust statute in reference
to agricultural associations. In an elaborate decision reviewing the
Missouri constitution with special reference to the section commencing
"The Legislature, to enact laws to prevent all trusts, combinations, con-
tracts and agreements inimical to the public welfare" the court said:
* * " putting the question differently, is this contract to be con-
demned even though it be not inimical to the public welfare? We think
this question is answered in the negative by following decisions in this
court; (cases cited) Chapter 88, Laws of I9OO, defining trusts and pro-
hibiting contracts in restraint of trade ..... .tests the essential of
its existence in that the contract or combination be on account of its
actual results obnoxious to the public policy or be in itself in its neces-
sary effect inimical to the public welfare..... .The legislature must
be given credit if language of the statute in question will permit of
legislating in the public interest. It is inconceivable that it was intended
by our Anti-Trust Statute to condemn any and all contracts between
two or more persons which might have the effect of hindering the free-
dom of trade even to the smallest extent. Such a construction, as it will
be seen at once, would lead to absurd results. It would destroy to a
large extent, the public welfare instead of promoting ..... .It would
be hard to conceive of how a steady market and a reasonable and a
profitable price for cotton to the producer would be inimical to the
public welfare in this state. On the contrary it would appear that
not only every cotton producer in the state would be benefitted thereby,
but also every other person engaged in any kind of business whatso-
ever.
We now turn to one of the most leading and prominent cases in the
country and decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 29 in 1923.
It might be well to review the situation leading up to the case in
question. It is common knowledge that in 1921 tobacco growers suf-
fered extremely from severe market fluctuations. Early in the buying
season tobacco was held for forty or more cents per pound on the
fields. Later in the same buying season the farmers were forced to
dispose of their crops at prices varying from six to ten cents per
pound. Tobacco buyers, while not efficiently organized, constituted
in the main of a few powerful firms whose policy it was to deal and
bargain with each farmer individually. As a result of the hardships
and losses resulting from this complicated, unsatisfactory and unstable
market, there was organized the Northern Wisconsin Co-operative
Tobacco Pool, which, after its organization, had under contract 75
per cent or more of the growers of tobacco in Wisconsin. Its stand-
ard contract by which these members were bound to the association,
I32 Miss. 859, 96 So. 849 (1923).
182 Wis. 571, 197 N.W. 936 (923). Northern Wisconsin Co-operative
Tobacco Market Association v. Bekkedal.
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provided for a penalty of five cents per pound for all tobacco sold to
others than the pool. It was organized under chapter 185 of the Wis-
consin statutes. One Bekkedal, by his agents, solicited farmers who
were members of the pool to sell their crops to him in violation of
their agreement with the pool. The action, under review, was insti-
tuted by the association for an injunction restraining the said Bekkedal
from interfering with the members of the pool and restraining him
from interfering with the established contracts. It was contended by
Bekkedal, the defendant, that the Wisconsin Tobacco crop was pe-
culiarly subject to monopolization because of its distinct quality; that
the plaintiff pool established a price upon its crop which was a mon-
opoly price; that the plaintiff acquired such monopolized control of
the tobacco crop in Wisconsin as to be able to disorganize, in its
first season, the entire distribution and marketing system of tobacco
in Wisconsin. The court said, assuming these several averments to
be true:
It is to be conceded that for a long time the public policy of this state
was in accordance with this statute declaration (referring to Sec. I747e
the Anti-Trust Statute). Probably such would have been the public
policy of this state in the absence of such statute declaration inasmuch
as the statute in question adds very little to the condemnation visited
upon such agreements at common law. It is not to be denied, how-
ever, that the public policy of the state with reference to combination
?nd agreements is within the control of the legislature and that such
public policy is subject to legislative control and modification.
* ' *If in the course of time changing conditions should give
rise to economic views and public opinion, wiping out the prejudice
hitherto entertained with reference to such combinations, and they
should come to be regarded as beneficial rather than injurious to the
public interest, there is no doubt of the power of the Legislature to com-
pletely reverse the public policy of -the state with reference to such
combinations and agreements and to promote rather than suppress the
same. So, also, if the Legislature should conclude that some combina-
tions are injurious while others are beneficial to the public interest,
no reason is perceived why the injurious combinations may not be pro-
hibited and the beneficial combinations encouraged, due regard being
had, of course, to the legal requirements concerning proper and germane
classification.
The court in recognizing the fact that agriculture is a distinct and
proper basis for constitutional classification proceeds to point out that
the first section of the co-operative law of the state provides that
any number of adult persons, not less than five, may organize as a
co-operative association. It seems to the writer, however, that the
designation in the statute five adult persons does not extend the
statute beyond agricultural commodities and that the five persons
mentioned are merely an indication of the number of farmers who may
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join for the purpose of organizing an association to market their
products. The court continues:
*.... We therefore hold that the validity of the plaintiff organi-
zation and its operations must be tested, not by the former public policy
of this state with reference to combinations and agreements in restraint
of trade, as declared by section I747e, but by the provisions of the co-
operative association statutes. So far as the contract is concerned, it
seems to be in conformity with those provisions. The statute specifically
provides that any number of persons may organize as a co-operative
association. This language negatives any legislative purpose to limit
the number of persons that may so organize, and the fact that 75 per
cent or even IOO per cent of the tobacco growers of the state affiliated
with this association does not render its organization illegal or its opera-
tions unlawful.
The Bekkedal case has been very widely quoted and established
without a doubt the validity of the standard marketing act as advo-
cated by Mr. Sapiro in its present Wisconsin form.
Reference has been made to several Kentucky cases earlier, in
which the state courts have upheld the classification of farmers as
a basis for statute preference, but which cases were over ruled in the
United States Supreme Court. In 1923 Potter v. Dark Tobacco
Growers' Co-operative Association" was decided and held the asso-
ciation valid. The court continues its insistence of the fact that asso-
ciations are not conspiracies in restraint of trade by their mere struc-
ture, but proof must be given of the monopolistic results of its activi-
ties. The court said:
There is neither allegation nor proof that a monopoly actually has
been created or that the trade has been restrained by the appellee.
Hence, it is clear that the contract cannot be annulled as violative of the
anti-trust laws neither the Sherman Act nor the common law now in
force in this state......
The underlying public opinion unmistakably demands that the
farmers be permitted to organize for the marketing of their crops not
merely for their own protection but for the public good. The Wis-
consin case and the Kentucky case and the North Carolina case were
followed in short order by the Tennessee Court in Dark Tobacco
Growers' Co-operative Association v. Mason,3°a in which it was said:
The corporation is undoubtedly of impressive size ..... .But we
must adhere to the law and the law does not make mere size an offense
or the existence of unexerted power an offence. It, we repeat, requires
overt acts and trusts to its prohibition of them and its power to repress
or punish them. It does not compel competition nor require all that is
possible . . . unless facts are shown which establish that the com-
W 2OI Kentucky 441, 257 S.W. 53- (1923).
zD I5o Tenn. 228, 263 S.W. 6o (1924).
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plainant has been guilty of one or more acts inimical in the interests
of the public, it cannot be declared an unlawful combination.
We need go no further than to merely cite the cases3 ' which have
followed unequivocally the rules set down in the preceding cases. The
result reached in all of them, practically without exception, has been
that where there is a legislative declaration exempting farmers from
anti-trust statutes and further allowing farmers and agriculture to
combine for the purpose of marketing their products, the mere fact
of combination will not in and of its self be a conspiracy in restraint
of trade. The standard marketing act enacted in practically every
state of the union has been held legal and in the words of Mr. Aaron
Sapiro, "it has run the gamut."
It is interesting to note that the Iowa Court in Clear Lake Co-opera-
tive Livestock Shippers Association v. Weir,3 2 is exceedingly careful
to make its decision, which was favorable to the association involved,
based on the fact of additional legislation, which legislation they held
to be a declaration of public policy. True, hindsight is far clearer than
foresight, but nevertheless we are unable to see why a declaration in an
anti-trust statute expressly exempting farmers from its provisions is
not just as much a declaration of public policy as a statute subsequently
enacted covering the same field. It will be recalled that it was the Iowa
Court that decided Reeves v. Decorah where such powerful adverse
language was used.
The success with which the Standard 111arketing Act has met has
in the majority of states led to additional enactments of "aid statutes."
The purpose of these statutes was to give to the associations remedies
not usually allowed to other corporations. The theory behind these
legislative helps was that the remedy at law was not adequate, that is,
for the associations to be successful they cannot rely upon monetary
damages. The associations need membership and they must have
adequate enforcement processes by which their membership may and
can be upheld. As a general rule the forty-two states which now
have enacted the standard marketing act have the following provisions
to aid the co-operants. First, the statute allowed specifically a pro-
vision in the members' contracts for liquidated damages. In attacks
'Hanel v. Cane Growers Co-operative Asso. I6A Ga. 3o, 126 S.E. 531;
Minnesota Wheat Growers' Co-operative Asso. v. Huggins, 162 Minn. 471, 203
N.W. 42I;.Warren v. Alabama Farmers Bureau Cotton Ass&. 213 Ala. I6I, 3o4
So. 264; Nebraska Wheat Growers Asso. v. Norquest 113 Neb. 731; Louisiana
Farmers Bureau Cotton Co-operative Asso. v. Clark, 16A La. 294, 107 So. II;
Manchester Dairy System, Inc. v. Hayzward K32A 12; List v. Burley Tobacco
Growers' Co-operative Asso. H34 O.S. 361, 151 N.E. 471; Rifle Potato Growers'
Co-operative Asso. v. Smith, 78 Col. I71, 240 P. 737; Clear Lake Co-
operative Livestock Shippers Asso. v. Weir, 2oo Ia. 1293, 2o6 N.W. 297.
=200 Ia., 1293, 206 N.W. 297.
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upon the associations who sought to enforce the contract pro-
vision for liquidated damages, the contention has often been made and
unsuccessfully so that the liquidated damage clause amounts to a
penalty, that a penalty is in the law invalid and consequently no re-
covery should be allowed. However, the courts have practically uni-
formly held that where the liquidated damages provided for in the
contract is not grossly excessive, such liquidated damages may be
recovered as contracted for.33
In some states, as in Wisconsin, there is a statutory limit allowing
recovery of liquidated damages up to a certain percentage of the value
of the crop sold outside the association. Chapter 185.o8 sub-section
3 of the Wisconsin Statute provides:
A provision in any such contract determining a specific sum to be
paid by the member as liquidated damages for breach of such contract
shall be valid, provided that the amount of such liquidated damages does
not exceed 30 per cent of the value of the products which are the sub-
ject of the breech.
Secondly, the Aid Statute provided as a general rule for specific
performance of the contract to sell between member and association.
It is well known that at common law there can be no action for specific
performance for the sale of personal property save in exceptional
cases. However, this remedy and likewise the remedy of injunction,
prohibiting the farmers from selling outside of the pool, has been
upheld as a valid exercise of the legislative power in legislating for
the public good.3 4  In sonle states we have the further remedy of
statutory enactment making it a criminal offense for anyone to know-
ingly interfere with a member's contract. Other statutes give the
association the right to recover a statutory amount of damages against
any outsider who wittingly obtains delivery of agricultural products
from a member under contract with the pool. In Wisconsin we have
perhaps the most drastic aid provision of all, namely scction 185.o8
sub-section 5 provides in effect the standard contract of members may
be recorded in the same manner as chattel mortgages, and that such
recording should be notice to the world of the fact that the member
named in the contract is bound to deliver his produce to the pool.
Further, the statute has its enforcement power in the provision which
allows the association to institute replevin proceedings against any
one who buys a member's crop after the uniform contract has been
recorded. No case on this, to the writer's knowledge, has been de-
Anaheim Citrus Fruit Association v. Yeoman, 51 Cal. App. 759; Minnesota
Co-operative Wheat Growers v. Huggins, 162 Minn. 471, 2o3 N.W. 42o.
, Oregon Growers Co-operative Association v. Lenz, Ibid; South Carolina
Cotton Growers Asso. v. English, 135 S.C. ig; Brown v. Staple Cotton Co-
operative Asso. Ibid.
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cided in the Supreme Court, although in March, 1928, the Northern
Wisconsin Co-operative Tobacco Pool instituted proceedings against
C. E. Sweeney and Sons of Edgerton to replevy a crop purchased by
said defendant in violation of the above mentioned statute. Quoting
the United States Tobacco Journal- dated April 28, 1928, we find:
The Northern Wisconsin Tobacco Pool won a complete victory in the
first case brought under the replevin statute by a stipulation settlement
in the pools case against C. E. Sweeney & Sons. Stipulation of settle-
merit was filed in the Dana County Circuit Court on April 18.
The final word of the entire problem herewith discussed was handed
down by the United States Supreme Court on February 2o, 1928, in
the case of Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley Tobacco Growers'
Co-operative Marketing Association.36 In brief, the case was an action
by the association to recover $500 statutory damages against the
warehouse company for violation of the statute which read as fol-
lows:
Any person or persons or any corporation whose officers or em-
ployees knowingly induce or attempt to induce any member or stock-
holder of an association organized hereunder to breach his marketing
contract with the association, or who maliciously and knowingly spreads
false reports about the finances or management thereof, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and be subject to a fine of not less than one hundred
dollars and not more than one thousand dollars for each such offense,
and shall be liable to the association aggrieved in a civil suit in the
penal sum of five hundred dollars for each such offense.
The answer of the defendant asserts that this section of the Bing-
ham Act conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment, abridges the de-
fendant's privileges and immunities of the United States; deprives
it of corporate life, liberty and property without due processes of
law and denies it the equal protection of the law. The answer also
sets up that the plaintiff is an unlawful trust or combination in re-
siraint of trade. A court, in answering these contentions says:
Section I presents no Federal question. It does not mention the
constitution or any statute of the United States, but claims that the
association is an unlawful trust or combination under common law
rules. But the present controversy concerns a statute and a state may
freely alter, amend or abolish the common law within the jurisdiction.
'The court then referring to the allegation that the defendant was
denied due process of law and equal protection of the law says:
The statute penalizes all who wittingly solicit, persuade or induce an
association member to break his marketing contract. It does not pre-
scribe more rigorous penalties for warehouse men than for other of-
fenders. Nobody is permitted to do what is denied to the warehouse
Vol. io9, No. 17.
2 48 Sp. Ct. Rept. 291.
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men. There is no substantial basis upon which to invoke the equal
protection clause.
Connelly v. Union Sewer Compaity is much relied upon, but there
the circumstances differ radically from those here presented......
This court held that because of the exemption in the Anti-Trust Statute,
the Union Company was denied the equal protection of the law. It
was forbidden to do what others could do with impunity. Here the
situation is very different. The questioned statute undertakes to pro-
tect sanctioned contracts against any interference-no one could law-
fully do what the warehouse company did.
At another point in the decision the court continues:
By the opinion generally accepted-and upon reasonable grounds that
they give his with the co-operative marketing statute promoted common
interest. The provisions for protecting the fundamental contracts
against interference by outsiders are essential to the question. This
court has recognized as permissible some discrimination intended to
encourage agriculture. Viewing all the circumstances, it is impossible
for us to say that the legislature of Kentucky could not treat marketing
contracts between the association and its members as of a separate class
providing against probable interference therewith and to the extent limit
the same time action of warehouse men.
This case, the last word of the United States Supreme Court, seems
to definitely settle the proposition herewith discussed.
In conclusion it might be well said that "they who are among the
trees do not see the forest." The subject of co-operating marketing
and restraint of trade in its various and sundry aspects has not only
been a legal proposition but one of volcanic political aspects as well.
The changing attitude of the courts of the country is perhaps one of
the finest examples of adaptation and crystallization of legal principles
to meet an economic situation. Legally it might be said that agri-
cultural co-operation is valid. It does not contravene the anciently
accepted idea of monopoly. It does not, in view of the latest decisions,
transgress rules against conspiracy in restraint of trade. Its contracts,
though exceedingly unique and long litigated, have been upheld and
are valid.
